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18 MAY 1976

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Where is the Agency Headed?

Two Themes: Change--the only constant.
Paying for success.

- Intelligence seems more central to policy-making process.
- Demands for products and higher quality products up.
- Feeding both sides (Executive Branch and Congress) of debate.
- In this environment, intelligence becomes ammunition, it's difficult to maintain security, and there is greater need to question the quality of our work.
- More data is required, better collection, better information handling.
- Public confidence and ability to get money is affected.
- Add to this a stronger USSR with few security problems.
- The country has a problem.

CLASSIFICATION 583892
EXPIRATION 18 May 1999
EXTENSION Same
REMARKS Multiple

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WHERE IS THE AGENCY HEADED?

- U.S. role in the world has changed,
- Country has changed,
- Our definition of intelligence has changed,
- And we are in a changed environment with respect to:
 - Security
 - Analysis and customer support
 - Collection
 - Information handling
 - Some questions

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Where is the Agency Headed?

Into a different security environment.

Some observations:

- We have been declassifying some facts and products, thinking about decompartmenting others, and, in general, making information about our business more widely available.
- Kampiles, the SALT II debate, Iran, sensitive court cases, and other events have combined to make public some aspects of our business previously secret.
- Greater reliance on resource decision making in a Community context has encouraged information sharing and reduced our capability to protect sensitive data in the Executive Branch and on the Hill.
- Like it or not, we are today serving more customers--- particularly in Congress---on more issues. A widening circle of people consider they have a right to our information, in classified and unclassified form.
- Our definition of "sensitive" is getting narrower.
- Moving from near total secrecy in all aspects of our business to a stance of some openness and some confidentiality is bound to involve a rocky adjustment period.
- Sense that security discipline has broken down.

Some implications for us:

- Employees and customers are less sure what is secret; the possibilities for leakage of sensitive information are increased.
- Possibility that all but the most sensitive details of our overhead programs will become public, that the arguments in favor of having a national program office will fade, and that basic functional or organizational changes may seem desirable. Possibility that this will extend to other areas as well.
- The narrower our definition of what is sensitive, the more difficulty we may have convincing the courts and Congress that it is crucial to keep some things secret.
- It may be difficult to convince cooperating services that we can keep what they consider secrets, thus reducing information from these sources and forcing us to more costly or difficult unilateral collection efforts, or limiting our ability to operate abroad.

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Where is the Agency Headed?

Into a different analysis and customer support environment,
characterized by:

- More Executive Branch customers, in numbers, organizational locations, and interests (grain estimates, narcotics). In effect, we have a much broader definition of "national security" than in 1947.
- More Congressional customers who are involved in policy debates on a wider range of international issues and who believe they need access to our views.
- Pressures to be "relevant" to policy makers' needs.
- More analytically aware customers, as the general educational level in Government rises, and more requests for better integrated analysis.
- Public distribution of and debate about, some of our product.
- We are farther from the 1947 concept of a single "all source" production shop in the USG than ever before. The emphasis is increasingly on "competitive centers."

Some implications for us:

- Our workload is increasing. This can only reduce quality, force us to ignore some topics or problems to maintain quality on others, send us on a search for greater efficiency in our process, or be met by increased resources.
- We will devote much effort to automating those aspects of the analytic process which do not demand creative effort (sorting mail, retrieving basic reference and other information, etc.). Automation may increase "creativity."
- Tighter central management of CIA's analytic process is likely to appear increasingly desirable but is probably unattainable.
- Pressures to do more integration of diverse but related aspects of problems...in short, pressures to answer broader questions.
- A continuing need for more broadly based people (generalists) and more flexible organizational arrangements.
- Emphasis upon "competitive centers" implies pressures on collectors and analysts to encourage a free flow of raw information and to operate from common data bases.
- Likelihood of more vigorous analytic competition from others, meaning that we will likely have to work harder to hold or improve our competitive edge, on a broader front.
- There will be continuing pressure to increase the responsiveness of collection systems to analyst needs.
- Threats to our intellectual integrity/independence of judgment.
- Pressures to clarify our evidence (i.e., reveal our sources).

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Where is the Agency Headed?

Into a different information handling environment characterized by:

- The capability for more efficient movement, dissemination, filing, retrieval, and manipulation of intelligence and management information, together with more user demand for such services.
- Use of computers for analysis, as opposed to retrieval, storage, or movement of information, is spreading.
- Possibilities for more participation by people in all our decision-making processes which: slows process if participation is serial, makes coordination more complex if participation is "parallel."
- Blurred distinctions between communications and automated data processing ("communications").
- Blurred distinctions between what is done by our central computer organizations versus what is done by other components.
- A larger portion of our "total information base" being located in Washington as opposed to the field.
- Reduced "distance" between collectors and analysts, and processors and analysts.
- Availability of higher capability information handling hardware at lower cost, probably more than offset by growing software costs.

Some implications for us:

- It will be possible, and many will think it desirable, to centralize more decision making in Headquarters and, here, at higher levels.
- New organizational arrangements or coordination/management arrangements are likely to be required to ensure compatibility of communications and computer systems.
- The functions of certain technical specialists (communicators, photo telemetry interpreters, data processors, registry clerks, secretaries) are likely to change drastically. Production analysts, case officers, and other professionals are likely to absorb some of the activities now carried out by cadres of specialists. Our personnel recruitment, and management practices and attitudes will have to evolve as well.
- More of our analytic and managerial workforce will be required to be conversant with computers to do their jobs.
- Security and counterintelligence activity related to data handling systems is likely to be a growth stock.
- Some of the reasons we now advance for physically locating or organizing people in particular ways are likely to be less important in the future.

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Some (Not Rhetorical) Questions for Consideration

- Our greatest long-term asset has been the fact that we are a single purpose organization focussed solely on intelligence. Is this still important to our customers?
- Will we be forced to readjust our evolving new definition of secrecy, or will the world adjust to us?
- Demands for more integrated problem solving (substantive and managerial) suggest collegial problem identification and analysis (through task forces, analytical "centers," and other cross-cutting managerial devices) will be increasingly desirable. Will this help us identify and integrate facts, points of view, more effectively? How do we decide when, and when not, to employ such techniques--particularly on interdirectorate problems? Will quality get better or worse?
- Will "pooling" of certain kinds of specialists (economists, photo- interpreters, ADP experts) continue to be a principal basis for organizing the way we do?
- If there is likely to be an increasing premium on broader experience as a qualification for higher position, with a parallel loss in specialization as a requirement, are we "growing" the right people?
- If customer pressures, resource limitations, and better communications and ADP tools encourage us to consider more centralized priority setting in the analytic and collection worlds, should we do it?
- Managers will need better ways to sort through the increasing amounts of information available to them. Will staff organizations help? What kind?
- If issues related to the handling of information are likely to be increasingly important, can we structure this activity to keep it in reasonable perspective?
- Is it likely that central control over the Intelligence Community, if it continues, and particularly if it is enhanced, will continue to narrow our definition of our mission within the Community? Will rising professionalism elsewhere and a narrowing of our control over sensitive information encourage this trend? Is it good or bad?

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

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Don - FVI

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These are the charts
the [REDACTED] used on Sat Friday.
As I said - the presentation
was much too profound to
stimulate any worthwhile
dialogue → Only 5/2,

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